# Keynes personal papers

## Mutual Aid Agreement Artcile VII discussions: minutes on International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

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TREASURY ..OF.. DIVISION 1

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INTERNATIONAL BANK.

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J.H. Gaston
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COPY NO. 34

A.S.D.(44) 8

18TH FEBRUARY, 1944.

ARTICLE 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA

UNITED NATIONS BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

I circulate herewith the United States proposals of November 1943 for a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development, together with a foreword by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. This document has been published in the United States with a preliminary indication that it is a draft in every sense, that it is still a preliminary document representing the views of the technical staffs of the U.S. Treasury and other U.S. Government Departments, and that it has not received the official approval of the U.S. Government.

(Signed) H.E. BROOKS

TREASURY.

18TH FEBRUARY, 1944.

in the financing of international trade.

It is not unreasonable

# FOREWORD

## A United Nations Bank

## For Reconstruction and Development

One of the important international economic and financial problems which will confront the United Nations at the end of the war will be the unprecedented need for foreign capital. In the areas devastated by war or plundered and ravaged by the enemy, factories and mines, public utilities and railroads, public buildings and public works will have to be repaired or restored. In all of the United Nations, industries now producing war goods will require capital for reconversion to peacetime production. Finally, in many areas of the world, large investment will be needed for industrial, agriculatural and commercial development.

Countries whose productive capacity has been seriously impaired by war will find that their industries cannot provide the capital goods and their people cannot provide the savings they require for reconstruction. Most non-industrial countries will of necessity be dependent upon foreign investment to acquire the funds for the purchase of machinery, equipment, and other capital goods for development. And even in those countries where a considerable part of the need for capital can be met locally, there will be some need for foreign capital to supplement the funds that can be raised at home.

With the return of an assured peace, private financial agencies may be expected to supply most of the needed short-term foreign capital. When the shipping situation is improved and peacetime industry here and abroad has recovered, many business firms will be eager to sell their products abroad on reasonable and even generous credit terms. And banks likewise will hasten to expand their foreign business, reopening and establishing branches abroad, and assisting in the financing of international trade.

It is not unreasonable to hope that with the return of peace there will also be a gradual resumption of long-term international investment, particularly in the form of the establishment of foreign branch plants and the acquisition of shares in established foreign enterprises. With the growth of confidence in monetary stability, foreign investments will gradually assume the form of publicly floated loans to governments and municipalities, and to public utilities and other industries.

This flow of private capital to war stricken countries will be encouraged by an adequate program of international relief and rehabilitation which helps to quickly restore to a working basis the economic life of those countries. Another, and possibly even more important, stimulant to foreign investments, would be the existence of an international agency, such as the International Stabilization Fund, designed to promote stability of foreign exchange rates and freedom from restrictions on the withdrawal of earnings. Such an agency could do much to enhance the attractiveness of foreign investments.

While there will undoubtedly be substantial amounts of long-term foreign investment even in the early postwar period, the flow of capital to countries greatly in need of foreign capital is likely to be inadequate for many years to come. Private capital will understandingly hesitate to venture abroad in anything like the required volume. It has suffered too many losses from war, from depreciating currencies, from exchange restrictions, and from business failures and defaults. There is little evidence to justify the hope that in the years immediately after the war investors will lend the large sums that can be economically used in foreign countries.

Obviously, it would be desirable to encourage in every way, the provision of capital for productive purposes through the usual private investment channels, and to the extent that private investment is inadequate, to provide supplemental facilities. The problem is fundamentally an international problem and only an international governmental agency equipped with broad powers and large resources can effectively encourage private capital to flow abroad in adequate amounts and provide a part of the capital not otherwise available.

The primary aim of such an agency should be to encourage private capital to go abroad for productive investment by sharing the risks of private investors and by participating with private investors in large ventures. The provision of some of the capital needed for reconstruction and development, where private capital is unable to take the risk, is intended to remain secondary in the operations of such an agency. It should, of course, scrupulously avoid undertaking loans that private investors are willing to make on reasonable terms. It should perform only that part of the task which private capital cannot do alone.

The need for foreign capital will be so great and the provision of adequate capital so important that it would be extremely shortsighted to neglect this urgent international problem. If private capital should suffice there would then be little for an international agency to do, beyond encouraging private investment. If, however, private capital were to prove unable fully to meet the needs, then such an international agency would be able to fill the breach until private capital again flowed freely and the demand for foreign capital throughout the world became less urgent.

It is imperative that we recognize that the investment of productive capital in undeveloped and in capital needy countries means not only that those countries will be able to supply at lower costs more of the goods the world needs, but that they will at the same time become better markets for the world's goods. By investing in countries in need of capital, the lending countries, therefore, help themselves as well as the borrowing countries. If the capital made available to foreign

countries would not otherwise have been currently employed, and if it is used for productive purposes, then the whole world is truly the gainer. Foreign trade everywhere will be increased; the real cost of producing the goods the world consumes will be lowered; and the economic well-being of the borrowing and lending countries will be raised.

One great contribution that the United Nations can make to sustained peace and world-wide prosperity is to make certain that adequate capital is available on reasonable terms for productive uses in capital-poor countries. With abundant capital, the devastated countries can move steadily toward rehabilitation and a constantly improving standard of living. Nothing could be more conducive to political stability and to international collaboration. Without adequate supplies of capital, however, recovery in Europe and Asia will be slow and sporadic, and economic discontent and international bitterness will in time assume disturbing proportions. To spend hundreds of billions to fight a war thrust upon us, and then to balk at investing a few billions to help assure peace and prosperity would appear to be a singularly unwise policy.

Accompanying this memorandum is a draft proposal for a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations. The draft was prepared by the technical staff of the United States Treasury in consultation with the technical staffs of other departments of this Government. The proposal has neither official status nor the approval of any department of this Government. It is in outline form touching on the more important points and is intended only to stimulate thoughtful discussion of the problem in the hope that such discussion will call forth constructive criticism, suggestions, and alternative proposals for possible later submission to the appropriate authorities and to the public.

A United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development is proposed as another international agency needed to help attain and maintain world-wide prosperity after the war. It is designed as a companion agency to an International Stabilization Fund. Each agency could stand and function effectively without the other; but the establishment of such a Bank would make easier the task of an International Stabilization Fund, and the successful operation of an International Stabilization Fund would enhance the effectiveness of the Bank. Together, the two institutions could help provide a sound financial foundation on which private enterprise can build a prosperous world economy.

HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Washington, D.C.
November, 1943.

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U.S. Treasury
November, 1943

Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for
A United Nations Bank
For Reconstruction and Development

Preamble

1. The provision of foreign capital will be one of the important international economic and financial problems of the postwar period. Many countries will require capital for reconstruction, for the conversion of their industries to peacetime needs, and for the development of their productive

resources. Others will find that foreign investment provides a growing market for their goods. Sound international investment can be of immense benefit to the lending as well as to the borrowing countries.

2. Even in the early postwar years it may be hoped that a considerable part of the capital for international investment will be provided through private investment channels. It will undoubtedly be necessary, however, to encourage private investment by assuming some of the risks that will be especially large immediately after the war and to supplement private investment with capital provided through international co-operation. The United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development is proposed as a permanent institution to encourage and facilitate international investment for sound and productive purposes.

3. The Bank is intended to co-operate with private financial agencies in making available long-term capital for reconstruction and development and to supplement such investment where private agencies are unable to meet fully the legitimate needs for capital for productive purposes. The Bank would make no loans or investments that could be secured from private investors on reasonable terms. The principal function of the Bank would be to guarantee and participate in loans made by private investment agencies and to lend directly from its own resources whatever additional capital may be needed. The facilities of the Bank would be available only for approved governmental and industrial projects which have been guaranteed by national governments. Operating under these principles, the Bank should be a powerful factor in encouraging the provision of private capital for international investment.

4. By making certain that capital is available for productive uses on reasonable terms, the Bank can make an important contribution to enduring peace and prosperity. With adequate capital, countries affected by the war can move steadily toward reconstruction, and the newer countries can undertake the economic development of which they are capable. International investment for these purposes can be a significant factor in expanding trade and in helping to maintain a high level of business activity throughout the world

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## I. The Purposes of the Bank

1. To assist in the reconstruction and development of member countries by co-operating with private financial agencies in the provision of capital for sound and constructive international investment.

2. To provide capital for reconstruction and development, under conditions which will amply safeguard the Bank's funds, when private financial agencies are unable to supply the needed capital for such purposes on reasonable terms consistent with the borrowing policies of member countries.

3. To facilitate a rapid and smooth transition from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy by increasing the flow of international investment, and thus to help avoid serious disruption of the economic life of member countries.

4. To assist in raising the productivity of member countries by helping to make available through international collaboration long-term capital for the sound development of productive resources.

5. To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade among member countries.

## II. Capital Structure of the Bank

1. The authorized capital shall be equivalent to about $10 billion consisting of shares having a par value equal to $100,000.

2. The shares of the Bank shall be non-transferable, non-assessable, and non-taxable. The liability on shares shall be limited to the unpaid portion of the subscription price.

3. Each government which is a member of the International Stabilization Fund shall subscribe to a number of shares to be determined by an agreed upon formula. The formula shall take into account such relevant data as the national income and the international trade of the member country.

   Such a formula would make the subscription of the United States approximately one-third of the total.

4. Payments on subscriptions to the shares of the Bank shall be made as follows:

   a. The initial payment of each member country shall be 20 percent of its subscription, some portion of which (not to exceed 20 percent) shall be in gold and the remainder in local currency. The proportions to be paid in gold and local currency shall be graduated according to an agreed upon schedule which shall take into account the adequacy of the gold and free foreign exchange holdings of each member country.

   b. The member countries shall make the initial payments within 60 days after the date set for the operations of the Bank to begin. The remainder of their respective subscriptions shall be paid in such amounts and at such times as the Board of Directors may determine, but not more than 20 percent of the subscription may be called in any one year.

   c. Calls for further payment on subscriptions shall be uniform on all shares, and no calls shall be made unless funds are needed for the operations of the Bank. The proportion of subsequent payments to be made in gold shall be determined by the schedule in II-4-a as it applies to each member country at the time of each call.

5. A substantial part of the subscribed capital of the Bank shall be reserved in the form of unpaid subscriptions as a surety fund for the securities guaranteed by the Bank or issued by the Bank.

6. When the cash resources of the Bank are substantially in excess of prospective needs, the Board may return, subject to future call, uniform proportions of the subscriptions. When the local currency holdings of the Bank exceed 20 percent of the subscription of any member country, the Board may arrange to repurchase with local currency some of the shares held by such a country.

7. Each member country agrees to repurchase each year its local currency held by the Bank amounting to not more than 2 percent of its paid subscription, paying for it with gold; provided, however, that:

   a. This requirement may be generally suspended for any year by a three-fourths vote of the Board.

   b. No country shall be required to repurchase local currency in any given year in excess of one-half of the addition to its official holdings of gold during the preceding year.

   c. The obligation of a member country to repurchase its local currency shall be limited to the amount of the local currency paid on its subscription.

8. All member countries agree that all of the local currency holdings and other assets of the Bank located in their countries shall be free from any special restrictions as to their use, except such restrictions as are consented to by the Bank, and subject to IV-13, below.

9. The resources and the facilities of the Bank shall be used exclusively for the benefit of member countries.

## III. The International Monetary Unit

1. The monetary unit of the Bank shall be the Unitas of the International Stabilization Fund (137-1/7 grains of fine gold, that is, equivalent to $10 U.S.).

2. The Bank shall keep its accounts in terms of unitas. The local currency assets of the Bank are to be guaranteed against any depreciation in their value in terms of unitas.

## IV. Powers and Operations

1. To achieve the purposes stated in Section I, the Bank may guarantee, participate in, or make loans to any member country and through the government of such country to any of its political subdivisions or to business or industrial enterprises therein under conditions provided below.

   a. The payment of interest and principal is fully guaranteed by the national government.

   b. The borrower is otherwise unable to secure the funds from other sources, even with the national government's guaranty of repayment, under conditions which in the opinion of the Bank are reasonable.

   c. A competent committee has made a careful study of the merits of the project or the program and, in a written report, concludes that the loan would serve directly or indirectly to raise the productivity of the borrowing country and that the prospects are favorable to the servicing of the loan. The majority of the committee making the report shall consist of members of the technical staff of the Bank. The committee shall include an expert selected by the country requesting the loan who may or may not be a member of the technical staff of the Bank.

IV-1 ... The Bank shall make arrangements to assure the use of the proceeds of any loan which it guarantees, participates in, or makes, for the purposes for which the loan was approved.

c. The Bank shall guarantee, participate in or make loans only at reasonable rates of interest with a schedule of repayment appropriate to the character of the project and the balance of payments prospects of the country of the borrower.

2. In accordance with the provisions in IV-1, above, the Bank may guarantee in whole or in part loans made by private investors provided further:

a. The rate of interest and other conditions of the loan are reasonable.

b. The Bank is compensated for its risk in guaranteeing the loan.

3. The Bank may participate in loans placed through the usual investment channels, provided all the conditions listed under IV-1 above are met except that the rate of interest may be higher than if the loans were guaranteed by the Bank.

4. The Bank may encourage and facilitate international investment in equity securities by securing the guarantee of governments of conversion into foreign exchange of the current earnings of such foreign held investments. In promoting this objective the Bank may also participate in such investments, but its aggregate participation in such equity securities shall not exceed 10 percent of its paid in capital.

5. The Bank may publicly offer any securities it has previously acquired. To facilitate the placing of such securities, the Bank may, in its discretion, guarantee them.

6. The Bank shall make no loans or investments that can be placed through the usual private investment channels on reasonable terms. The Bank shall by regulation prescribe procedure for its operations that will assure the application of this principle.

7. The Bank shall impose no condition upon a loan as to the particular member country in which the proceeds of the loan must be spent; provided, however, that the proceeds of a loan may not be spent in any country which is not a member country without the approval of the Bank.

8. The Bank in making loans shall provide that:

a. The foreign exchange in connection with the project or program shall be provided by the Bank in the currencies of the countries in which the proceeds of the loan will be spent and only with the approval of such countries.

b. The local currency needs in connection with the project shall be largely financed locally without the assistance of the Bank.

IV-8. c. In special circumstances, where the Bank considers that the local part of any project cannot be financed at home except on very unreasonable terms, it can lend that portion to the borrower in local currency.

d. Where the developmental program will give rise to an increased need for foreign exchange for purposes not directly needed for that program yet resulting from the program, the Bank will provide an appropriate part of the loan in gold or desired foreign exchange.

9. When a loan is made by the Bank it shall credit the account of the borrower with the amount of the loan. Payment shall be made from this account to meet drafts covering audited expenses.

10. Loans participated in or made by the Bank shall contain the following payment provisions:

a. Payment of interest due on loans shall be made in currencies acceptable to the Bank or in gold. Interest will be payable only on amounts withdrawn.

b. Payment on account of principal of a loan shall be in currencies acceptable to the Bank or in gold. If the Bank and the borrower should so agree at the time a loan is made, payment on principal may be in gold, or at the option of the borrower, in the currency actually borrowed.

c. In event of an acute exchange stringency the Bank may in its judgment accept for periods not exceeding 3 years at a time the payments of interest and principal in local currency. The Bank shall arrange with the borrowing country for the repurchase of such local currency over a period of years on appropriate terms that safeguard the value of the Bank's holdings of such currency.

d. Payments of interest and principal, whether made in member currencies or in gold, must be equivalent to the unitas value of the loan and of the contractual interest thereon.

11. The Bank may levy a charge against the borrower for its expenses in investigating any loan placed, guaranteed, participated in, or made in whole or in part by the Bank.

12. The Bank may guarantee, participate in, or make loans to international governmental agencies for objectives consonant with the purposes of the Bank, provided that one-half of the participants in the international agencies are members of the Bank.

13. In considering any application to guarantee, participate in, or make a loan to a member country, the Bank shall give due regard to the effect of such a loan on business and financial conditions in the country in which the loan is to be spent, and shall accordingly obtain the consent of the country affected.

14. At the request of the countries in which portions of the loan are spent, the Bank will repurchase for gold or needed foreign exchange a part of the expenditures in the currencies of those countries made by the borrower from the proceeds of the loan.

15. With the approval of the representatives of the governments of the member countries involved, the Bank may engage in the following operations:

a. It may issue, buy or sell, pledge, or discount any of its own securities and obligations, or securities and obligations taken from its portfolio, or securities which it has guaranteed.

b. It may borrow from any member governments, fiscal agencies, central banks, stabilization funds, private financial institutions in member countries, or from international financial agencies.

c. It may buy or sell foreign exchange, after consultation with the International Stabilization Fund, where such transactions are necessary in connection with its operations.

16. The Bank may act as agent or correspondent for the governments of member countries, their central banks, stabilization funds and fiscal agencies, and for international financial institutions.

The Bank may act as trustee, registrar or agent in connection with loans guaranteed, participated in, made, or placed through the Bank.

17. Except as otherwise indicated the Bank shall deal only with or through:

a. The governments of member countries, their central banks, stabilization funds and fiscal agencies.

b. The International Stabilization Fund and any other international financial agencies owned predominantly by member governments.

The Bank may, nevertheless, with the approval of the member of the Board representing the government of the country concerned deal with the public or institutions of member countries in its (the Bank's) own securities or securities which it has guaranteed.

18. If the Bank shall declare any country as suspended from membership, the member governments and their agencies agree not to extend any financial assistance to that country without the approval of the Bank until the country has been restored to membership.

19. The Bank and its officers shall scrupulously avoid interference in the political affairs of any member country. This provision shall not limit the right of an officer of the Bank to participate in the political life of his own country.

The Bank shall not be influenced in its decisions with respect to applications for loans by the political character of the government of the country requesting a loan. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to the Bank's decisions.

## V. Management

1. The administration of the Bank shall be vested in a Board of Directors composed of one director and one alternate appointed by each member government in a manner to be determined by it.

   The director and alternate shall serve for a period of three years, subject to the pleasure of their government. Directors and alternates may be reappointed.

2. Voting by the Board shall be as follows:

   a. The director or alternate of each member country shall be entitled to cast 1,000 votes plus one vote for each share of stock held. Thus a government owning one share shall cast 1,001 votes, while a government having 1,000 shares shall cast 2,000 votes.

   b. No country shall cast more than 25 percent of the aggregate votes.

   c. Except where otherwise provided, decisions of the Board of Directors shall be by simple majority of the votes cast, each member of the Board casting the votes allotted to his government. When deemed to be in the best interests of the Bank, decisions of the Board may be made, without a meeting, by polling the directors on specific questions submitted to them in such manner as the Board shall by regulation provide.

3. The Board of Directors shall select a President of the Bank, who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank and ex-officio a member of the Board, and one or more vice presidents. The President and vice presidents of the Bank shall hold office for four years, shall be eligible for reelection, and may be removed for cause at any time by the Board. The staff of the Bank shall be selected in accordance with regulations established by the Board of Directors.

4. The Board of Directors shall appoint from among its members, an Executive Committee of not more than nine members. The President of the Bank shall be an ex-officio member of the Executive Committee.

   The Executive Committee shall be continuously available at the head office of the Bank and shall exercise the authority delegated to it by the Board. In the absence of any member of the Executive Committee, his alternate on the Board shall act in his place. Members of the Executive Committee shall receive appropriate remuneration.

5. The Board of Directors shall select an Advisory Council of seven members. The Council shall advise with the Board and the officers of the Bank on matters of general policy. The Council shall meet annually and on such other occasions as the Board may request.

The members of the Advisory Council shall be selected from men of outstanding ability, but not more than one member shall be selected from the same country. They shall serve for two years, and the term of any member may be renewed. Members of the Council shall be paid their expenses and a remuneration to be fixed by the Board.

6. The Board of Directors may appoint such other committees as it finds necessary for the work of the Bank. It may also appoint advisory committees chosen wholly or partially from persons not regularly employed by the Bank.

7. The Board of Directors may at any meeting authorize any officers or committees of the Bank to exercise any specified powers of the Board except the power to make, guarantee or participate in loans. Such powers shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the general policies and practices of the Board.

The Board may by a three-fourths vote delegate to the Executive Committee the power to make, guarantee or participate in loans in such amounts as may be fixed by the Board. In passing upon applications for loans, the Executive Committee shall act under the requirements specified for each type of loan.

8. A member country failing to meet its financial obligations to the Bank may be declared in default and it may be suspended from membership during the period of its default provided a majority of the member countries so decide. While under suspension, the country shall be denied the privileges of membership, but shall be subject to the obligations of membership. At the end of one year the country shall be automatically dropped from membership in the Bank unless it has been restored to good standing by a majority of the member countries.

If a member country elects to withdraw or is dropped from the Bank its shares of stock shall, if the Bank has a surplus, be repurchased at the price paid. If the Bank's books show a loss, such country shall bear a proportionate share of the loss. The Bank shall have 5 years in which to liquidate its obligations to a member withdrawing or dropped from the Bank.

Any member country that withdraws or is dropped from the International Stabilization Fund, shall relinquish its membership in the Bank unless three-fourths of the member votes favor its remaining as a member.

9. The yearly net profits shall be applied as follows:

   a. All profits shall be distributed in proportion to shares held, except that one-fourth of the profits shall be applied to surplus until the surplus equals 20 percent of the capital.

   b. Profits shall be payable in a country's local currency, or in gold at the option of the Bank.

10. The Bank shall collect and make available to member countries and to the International Stabilization Fund financial and economic information and reports relating to the operations of the Bank.

Member countries shall furnish the Bank with all information and data that would facilitate the operations of the Bank.

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## ARTICLE VII. DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA.

## UNITED NATIONS BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

### Note by the United Kingdom Treasury

It has only quite recently been possible to begin the examination of the United States Treasury proposals which have been circulated as A.S.D.(44)8, and we have had no indication of the views which United Kingdom Ministers are likely to take. The attached paper by Lord Keynes is circulated to show how far our thinking has gone up to the present, in the hope that this may facilitate discussion.

(Signed) H.E. BROOKS.

Joint Secretary.

Treasury Chambers,
London, S.W.1.

7th March, 1944.

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for which pa… below) it is deliberately made quite useless. … than this. For by insisting that international loans should alwa… create new exports by the lending country, the Plan deprives us of… what should be the normal instrument for preserving equilibrium in… current trade.

4. The Plan provides that "the Bank shall impose no condition… upon a loan as to the particular member country in which the proc…

NOTES BY LORD KEYNES ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS
FOR A BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
(circulated as A.S.D.(44)8)

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1. The Plan is based on making no distinction between countries, according as they have a surplus or a deficit in their balance of payments, in respect of their ability to provide overseas loans. It is understood that the reason for this is political, namely that the Plan should not appear to put any special responsibilities on U.S. This is, of course, out of relation to the facts; and no one disputes that. Most of the other peculiar provisions of the Plan are, therefore, directed to bringing it back, by various obscure and devious devices and qualifications, towards common-sense.

2. In order that the above basic assumption should not cause a breakdown in the operation of the scheme from the start, it is further assumed that the Plan is primarily concerned with financing the export of capital goods <u>which would not otherwise exist</u> and is, therefore, a net addition to the overseas resources of the exporting country. This makes preliminary sense of the Plan because, on this assumption, a debtor country, which is called on to make a loan to finance additional exports, which are a net addition to what it would export otherwise, is no worse off than before. <u>Ergo</u> a country with an adverse balance of payments is in just as good a position to make overseas loans of this special character, as it would be if it had a favourable balance of payments.

3. There are two difficulties here. In the first place, it is most unlikely that none of the capital goods exports financed by the Plan would occur otherwise and that, in the absence of the Plan, there would be no alternative means whatever of financing any of them. Moreover, there is, perhaps, a let-out under IV(8)(d) by which subscriptions can be used to finance miscellaneous exports, which could be much less easily segregated as necessarily additional. (See also §4 below; whether this is in fact the intention, I am far from sure). In the second place, in so far as the assumption is fulfilled, the Plan can play no part in remedying or offsetting existing disequilibrium in the balances of payments between countries. It will leave these exactly as they were before. Dr. White agreed emphatically that this was so. The Plan is intended to facilitate the capital improvement of undeveloped areas by financing works which otherwise could not exist. It is not intended to remedy dis-equilibria arising in the ordinary course of international trade, for which purpose (apart from the qualifications to be mentioned below) it is deliberately made quite useless. Indeed it is worse than this. For by insisting that international loans should always create <u>new</u> exports by the lending country, the Plan deprives us of what should be the normal instrument for preserving equilibrium in current trade.

4. The Plan provides that "the Bank shall impose no condition upon a loan as to the particular member country in which the proceeds of the loan must be spent." Some have found this very comforting. But it is, unfortunately, deceptive. China, let us say, is given a loan of £20,000,000. China is, it is true, free to decide where she shall spend it. But if she decides to spend £5,000,000 of it in U.K., then it is the U.K. which has to find the requisite £5,000,000 finance. Thus the source of the exports and the source of the finance, so far from being left independent, are as closely tied up, one to the other, as is conceivable.

5. This provision leads inevitably to another. It is only possible to say definitely where the loan is spent, if the loan is tied to the purchase of capital goods directly imported for the purpose of the development which is being financed. The above technique cannot easily be applied to financing the import of, for example, consumption goods for the sustenance of the local labour employed on the capital works. If there is a loan for the drainage of the Yang-tse Valley, it can be used to pay for the bull-dozers imported. But most of the expenditure incurred will be for the wages of coolie labour, the spending of which will indirectly cause increased imports of a variety of consumption goods. This expenditure is, in general, ineligible for the loan. Thus the loans under the Plan will only be attractive or practicable for the borrowing country if it is in a position to finance out of its own resources a large, and often a predominant, part of the capital works in view.

6. In general, the loans have to be serviced in gold or acceptable foreign currencies (subject to the qualification in IV(10(c)). The service of the loans incurred in the earlier years cannot be met (as was so often the case with the British nineteenth century loans) out of loans incurred in subsequent years, since loans under the Plan are not allowed to be used in this way. Before a loan is made "a competent committee" has to certify "that the prospects are favourable to the servicing of the loan." An incompetent committee might, one feels, be more practically useful in this context.

7. The basic principles of the Plan, therefore, not only do nothing to remedy existing disequilibria, but are also of only limited usefulness for promoting development. All this becomes so obvious when the nature of the Plan is understood that its authors, who are fully aware of these objections, have been at much pains to do something about it. Having offered this glowing tribute to the supposed preference of politicians and the public for what makes no sense, they then introduce a series of jokers and not too obvious qualifications which tend to bring the Plan back again to terra firma. It is these qualifications to which we must now turn, with a view to determining whether they are in fact sufficient to rescue the Plan.

8. There are two principal difficulties to be overcome -

(i) the limitation on the usefulness of the loans to the borrowing country due to the condition that they can only be used to pay for capital goods directly required by the new investment;

(ii) the limitation on the usefulness of the Plan to remedy disequilibria due to the condition that the exporting country must always finance its own exports.

9. An attempt is made to deal with (i) in IV(8)(d). (IV(8)(c) merely means (e.g.) that China's own subscription to the Bank may, exceptionally, be released for expenditure in China). But the Bank's capacity to relax under this clause on any significant scale (unless the local currency subscriptions are intended to be available for this purpose, which is far from clear) is limited by the fact that the Bank has very little free foreign exchange with which to implement any relaxation. In order to provide at least some free exchange for this purpose, II(4)(a) requires some part of a member's initial subscription to be paid in gold, this proportion to be 20 per cent for a rich country and something less than this for a poor country. It seems doubtful whether, under this, much more than 10 per cent of the loans could be made available as free exchange. In addition to this a further 2 per cent per annum must

be put up in gold (II (7)) by those countries whose gold reserves are increasing. I believe that IV (5), under which the Bank may guarantee and sell a loan which it has made originally out of its subscribed funds, and also IV (15), are intended as means of furnishing the Bank with a supply of free exchange.

10. (ii) is dealt with to a very small extent by the provision just mentioned by which a creditor country pays a larger gold contribution than a debtor country. In the main, however, it is dealt with by a much more subtle and far-reaching provision.

11. This provision is as follows. The above limitations apply to loans which the Bank makes direct out of its own subscribed resources. But the Bank is also entitled to guarantee loans made through the usual investment channels out of new money raised currently in the market. I understand that the proceeds of such loans can be spent anywhere without restriction, and not merely in the country in which the loan has been subscribed. For example, if the Bank itself makes a loan of £20,000,000 to China out of its subscribed funds, China's expenditure out of it has to be financed by the country where the expenditure is made. But if the Bank guarantees a loan of £20,000,000 to China raised in the New York market, the spending of the proceeds of such a loan is in no way tied to the U.S.

12. In so far, therefore, as the Bank uses its power of guarantee, rather than that of direct lending, it is capable of remedying current disequilibria in the balance of payments of the lending country and of giving the borrowing country exchange which could be used to pay for any kind of imports, visible or invisible, and not restricted to specified capital goods. I pointed out to Dr. White, when I was in Washington, that, if it were clear that this was the primary way in which the Bank would operate, the Plan would touch the spot more successfully than if it were to operate in the way in which it more obviously purports to operate. I suggested that, if the subscribed capital of the Bank were to be wholly or mainly reserved as a guarantee fund, this would make better sense of the proposed participation of member countries having no available surplus on their balance of payments. To meet this Dr. White introduced what is now II (5).

13. Nevertheless this procedure also is not free from difficulty. It is far from clear in what way the Bank is free to use its resources to implement any guarantee which falls due to be met. Presumably, however, it is intended that only the dollars originally subscribed by the U.S. Government would be available to compensate U.S. investors whose loans had been guaranteed. The sterling subscribed by the U.K. Government would only be available to compensate British investors. Thus each Government, so to speak, guarantees its own investors *via* the Fund. Nevertheless the clause, obviously required to deal with this, is at present missing.

14. It should be here interposed that §9 and §13 above are written on the assumption that Clause II (8) of the Plan does not mean quite what it says. I believe that this clause means that the Bank's holdings of local currency

"shall be free from any special restrictions as to their use" within the country. For otherwise it would clearly be impossible for countries without a favourable balance of payments to subscribe to the Bank on the scale indicated. Even so interpreted, however, II (8) is dangerous. For it might mean that the part of the original subscription provided in local currency would be available to finance exports of consumption goods from the subscriber under the relaxation of the normal condition under IV (8)(d). In this case a member's subscription might be applied to finance its normal, and not merely its additional, exports, thus aggravating its balance of payments difficulties. If this is indeed the intention, it should be brought out more clearly.

15. Whilst the Plan is highly symmetrical as between countries having surpluses or deficits on their balance of payments respectively, it is highly unsymmetrical in its attitude towards private enterprise in lending and in borrowing countries respectively. In the lending country there are elaborate provisions for allowing private enterprise a prior opportunity and for collaborating with it without the interposition of the country's Government. But every loan in which the Bank participates, whether directly or by guarantee, must be fully guaranteed, by the Government of the borrowing country.

16. The subscription expected from U.K. would probably be about £250,000,000 compared with £750,000,000 from U.S. Obviously this does not correspond to the realities or the requirements of the actual conditions.

17. We do not want to express our criticisms to the United States Treasury in a way which is non-cooperative or obstructive. We feel very strongly indeed that loans from creditor countries to debtor countries in the early post-war period are essential to avoid widespread economic chaos and much needless human suffering. Without them no International Monetary Plan can have a fair start and the reduction of barriers to trade will be frustrated by acute balance of payment difficulties.

18. But it is essential that the loans made should be such as will achieve the purpose desired. Any loans, supported by an international institution, should satisfy the two conditions:-

(i) that the proceeds of the loan should be free exchange available to the borrower to expend in any market for requirements arising out of the project under finance whether the primary expenditure is inside or outside the borrowing country; and

(ii) that no country should be obligated to subscribe, directly or indirectly, to such loans, unless its monetary authority has approved such subscription as being within the capacity of the country's balance of payments at the time when it has to be made.

19. It follows that each individual loan, approved by such an institution, must be actually subscribed by the government or in the market of the lending country after any necessary approval from the monetary authority. The part to be played by the international institution should be primarily concerned with the two functions following:-

(i) The expert examination of projects for international loans for which a guarantee by the United Nations Bank has been or might appropriately be sought, with regard to the degree of priority which should be accorded to each of such projects, to the reliability and technical capacity

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END

of those who would handle it, and to the prospects of servicing it in free exchange;

(ii) the guaranteeing of the service of the loan out of an internationally subscribed fund. If, even with the guarantee, a loan could not be raised at a low rate of interest on the market, it is important that the Government of the country by which the loan is to be made should itself make the loan (and obtain the benefit of the guarantee).

20. The facilitation of suitable loans from creditor countries to countries in need of reconstruction and development is so much in the general interests of the world economy and of equilibrium in the international balances of payment, that countries which fall into neither of these two categories can reasonably be asked to contribute to the guarantee fund within the limits of their reasonable capacity. It is, however, important to ensure, so far as possible, that any calls on the guarantees shall be kept within as narrow limits as possible and should be spread over as long a period as possible. For this reason it is suggested (i) that the service of the loans should take the form of terminable annuities covering both interest and repayment of principal, so that, in the event of default, no large capital sum falls due for repayment but only the continuance of the annuities; and (ii) that the institution should charge a substantial commission at a flat rate of (say) 1 per cent per annum on all loans guaranteed by it, the accumulations of which would be drawn upon before calling on guarantees.

21. It should be made clear that the institution would be concerned with loans for postwar reconstruction as well as for new development.

22. Our first step must be to submit these essential principles to the United States Treasury. Until the principles are agreed, we feel that it would be a mistake to consider drafting amendments or detailed points, or to attempt to draw up the outlines of an alternative Plan. We feel that the best constructive contribution we can make to progress will be to set out the main principles which we regard as essential and to seek to obtain agreement on those principles.

K.

Treasury.
7th March, 1944.